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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Minnesota, most actions for breach of employment
contracts are governed by a two-year statute of limitations for the
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1

recovery of wages. The application of the statute, however, has
often been complicated by the ongoing wage payments typically
2
associated with employment contracts. Disputes arising out of the
employment relationship very often affect the periodic wage
3
payments associated with most occupations. As a result, Minnesota
courts have been faced with the question of whether subsequent
4
paychecks issued after a breach reset the limitations period. The
courts’ decisions regarding how pay periods affect breaches of
employment contracts have led to a less than uniform application
5
of the statute of limitations.
6
In Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, the Minnesota Supreme
Court clarified the standard for applying the statute of limitations
in wage recovery claims. The court was confronted with the
question of whether reduced salary payments, occurring as a result
of an employer’s termination of a company policy more than three
years prior, started separate two-year limitations periods each time
7
payment became due but was not paid. The court unanimously
held that reduced wage payments resulting from a failure to honor
a policy that alters job responsibilities do not constitute separate
causes of action with distinct accrual dates and thus do not start
8
separate limitations periods. The Park Nicollet decision resolves
some uncertainty surrounding the effect that wage payments have
on the accrual of breach of employment contract actions, but, in so
doing, may have adversely impacted employees’ future ability to
recover benefits owed under revoked or terminated policies.
This note begins by reviewing statutes of limitations in terms of
their purpose, origin, and historical development, both generally
1. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2011).
2. See infra Part II.D.
3. See infra Part II.D.
4. See infra Part II.D.
5. Compare McGoldrick v. Datatrak Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897–98 (D.
Minn. 1999) (holding that when the claim is based on an ongoing nonpayment of
wages, the cause of action accrues separately each time a payment is due but not
paid), and Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1989) (holding that
each failure to pay commission payments when they were due constituted a new
cause of action from which a separate limitations period would run), with
Medtronic, Inc. v. Shope, 135 F. Supp. 2d 988, 992 (D. Minn. 2001) (holding that
an employer’s cancellation of stock certificates was not an anticipatory repudiation
and distinguishing the holding in Levin as only applying to an anticipatory
repudiation of a future obligation, not to a breach of a present obligation).
6. 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011).
7. Id. at 832.
8. Id. at 837.
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9

and in the State of Minnesota specifically. Following the general
and historical review, this note discusses the facts and arguments
10
raised in Park Nicollet, and then analyzes the decision reached by
the Minnesota Supreme Court with an emphasis on future issues
11
This note concludes by
that the decision potentially raises.
arguing that the Park Nicollet decision may unfairly restrict
employees’ ability to recover benefits owed to them under policies
that are revoked by employers before employees become eligible to
12
receive them.
II. HISTORY
A.

Statutes of Limitations in General

Statutes of limitations are legislatively enacted time periods
within which various legal actions must be commenced and certain
13
rights may be enforced. They generally deprive a party of the
opportunity, after a certain time, to invoke public power in support
14
of an otherwise legitimate claim against another. The purpose
behind limiting the time in which to bring an otherwise valid cause
of action is primarily to prevent the prosecution of stale claims
where “evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
15
have disappeared.”
Accordingly, policy considerations behind
such legislation have historically involved weighing the importance
of providing plaintiffs with a fair and reasonable opportunity to
litigate their claims against countervailing interests of fairness to
16
defendants.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
1 HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATION OF ACTIONS AT LAW
AND IN EQUITY § 4, at 1 (4th ed. 1916).
14. Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185
(1950) [hereinafter Statutes of Limitations]; see also Simington v. Minn. Veterans
Home, 464 N.W.2d 529, 530 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (“Summary judgment based
on a statute of limitations is a decision on the merits and as res judicata, it bars
relitigation of the same issue.” (citing Nitz v. Nitz, 456 N.W.2d 450, 452 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1990))); Harry B. Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations, 21 IND. L.J.
23, 23 (1945) (“Anglo-American jurisprudence always has been cautious in cutting
off claims on bases which do not go to the merit of the action.”).
15. McCarty v. Boeing Co., 321 F. Supp. 260, 261 (W.D. Wash. 1970)
(footnote omitted).
16. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1185 (“The primary consideration
underlying [statutes of limitations] is undoubtedly one of fairness to the
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Origin and Background

Generally, codified time limitations on actions were
17
established in early Roman law and then spread throughout
Continental Europe.
In England, early limitations periods
prohibited actions based on seisin that occurred prior to a notable
18
or well-known date, like the coronation of King Henry II.
Eventually, the use of arbitrary dates to limit actions became
ineffective at reducing the influx of stale claims and gave way to the
use of fixed time periods, starting with the statute of 32 Henry 8 in
1540, which limited the time for bringing certain actions pertaining
19
to realty.
England continued to refine its limitations system to meet the
20
needs of a growing society.
In a further effort to keep
21
inconsequential and stale claims out of the King’s courts, England
enacted the Limitations Act of 1623, which, for the first time,
22
placed fixed time limits for bringing certain personal actions.
The Limitations Act established different limitations periods for
different types of claims, but generally prescribed a six-year time
23
period for the bringing of most personal actions. Ultimately, the
Limitations Act of 1623 marked the beginning of modern
defendant.”); see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463−64
(1975) (“[T]he period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value
judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid
claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale
ones.”).
17. See RUDOLPH SOHM, THE INSTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND
SYSTEM OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 318–22 (James Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1907).
18. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 81 (2d ed. 1898) (discussing that as early as 1236, England enacted
statutes that prohibited real property actions based on seisin prior to the
coronation of Henry II); see also WOOD, supra note 13, § 2, at 6 (“[T]he legislature
did not at first fix any certain and progressive period within which actions should
be commenced, but from time to time chose for that purpose certain notable
times . . . [such as] the beginning of the reign of King Henry the First, the return
of King John from Ireland, the journey of Henry the Third into Normandy, and
the coronation of King Richard the First . . . .”).
19. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1177 n.4 (stating that the statute of
32 Henry 8 limited seisin claims to thirty to sixty years from last seisin of claimant
or ancestor); see also WOOD, supra note 13, § 2, at 6.
20. For further information on the development of statutes of limitations in
England, see Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1177–78.
21. Id. at 1178.
22. Limitations Act, 1623, 21 Jac 1, c. 16 (prohibiting actions to recover land
more than twenty years after the accrual of the right).
23. Id.
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24

limitations on personal actions.
The substance of the Act,
including the six-year time period, was eventually copied by many
25
of the early American colonies and eventually served as the
26
foundation for the limitations system of the United States.
C.

Development in the United States

The proliferation of U.S. statutes limiting both civil and
criminal actions continued to evolve from the system inherited
27
from England. As no uniform federal statute of limitations has
ever been enacted to standardize the time in which to bring various
28
state claims, the time for bringing most actions is governed by
29
individual statutes found in every state. Initially, the various state
statutes prescribed relatively long limitations periods and only
differentiated between a few types of actions, leaving most actions
30
governed by a “general” statute of limitations.
Gradually,
however, individual states began to increase the number of
categorical distinctions between actions in an effort to tailor
specific limitations periods to address the particular concerns of
31
different claims.
Ultimately, the state level transition to more
specific limitations periods also resulted in shorter time periods in
32
which to bring most actions.
The continuing shift by judicial and legislative refinement
33
from longer to shorter limitations periods is also believed to be

24. Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1178.
25. See, e.g., The Acts and Resolves of Province of Massachusetts Bay for 1770–
71 (providing a period of six years for personal accounts and for debt under
contract not under seal); The Colonial Laws of New York for 1664–1719, v. 1,
p. 155 (providing a six-year period for all personal actions of account and upon
the case).
26. John R. Mix, Comment, State Statutes of Limitations: Contrasted and
Compared, 3 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 106, 107 (1931) (“The substance of [the
Limitations Act] was copied early in the history of the American Colonies.”).
27. See, e.g., N.J. REV. LAWS 263 (1820) (limitations statute enacted in 1796).
28. For an analysis of the potential advantages of adopting uniform
limitations periods under a federal statute of limitations, see Mix, supra note 26, at
116–17.
29. For a detailed analysis and comparison of early state statutes of
limitations, see Littell, supra note 14, and Mix, supra note 26.
30. See Littell, supra note 14, at 32 (“A general limitation is essential since a
legislature cannot foresee all statutory actions which subsequently will be
enacted.”).
31. Id. at 24.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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consistent with the purpose for which statutes of limitations were
34
first enacted. In general, statutes of limitations are based on the
idea that defendants should not be called on to defend claims after
35
“papers may be lost, facts forgotten, or witnesses dead.”
The
length of time prescribed by statute is arbitrary and does not
36
differentiate between just and unjust claims. By barring claims
after a certain period, the statutes compel the settlement of
disputes within a reasonable time, and the legislature’s codification
of what constitutes a reasonable time reflects an inherent value
judgment as to the importance that the state places on the
37
expedient resolution of those sorts of disputes.
D.

Development in Minnesota

As with most state statutes of limitations around the turn of the
century, the early limitations statute in Minnesota did not
distinguish between employment wage claims and general claims
38
arising under a contract.
The early statute simply provided a
general limitations period of six years that applied to most
39
It was not until 1945 that the Minnesota legislature
actions.
adopted and codified a separate two-year limitations period for the
34. See supra Part II.A; see also Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314 (1945) (“Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and
convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than
principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from
litigation of stale claims . . . .”); Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1185 (“The
primary consideration underlying [statutes of limitations] is undoubtedly one of
fairness to the defendant.”).
35. Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694,
697 (1937) (acknowledging that “[a] statute of limitation is based to a great extent
on the proposition that if one person has a claim against another . . . it would be
inequitable for him to assert such claim after an unreasonable lapse of time,
during which such other has been permitted to rest in the belief that no such
claim existed.”); see Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321
U.S. 342, 349 (1897).
36. Chase Sec. Corp., 325 U.S. at 314 (“[Statutes of limitations] are by
definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just
and the unjust claim, or the voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into
the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a
public policy about the privilege to litigate.” (footnotes omitted)).
37. WOOD, supra note 13, § 5.
38. See
MINN.
REV.
LAWS
§
4076
(1905),
available
at
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/data/revisor/statute/1905/1905-077.pdf.
39. See id. The six-year limitations period codified in the early state statutes
was inherited from the original English Limitation Act of 1623. Mix, supra note
26, at 108–09.
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40

recovery of wages specifically. The adoption of a separate, shorter
period for wage recovery claims, in Minnesota and elsewhere, was
likely prompted by growing public concern over strained judicial
resources caused by significant increases in so-called “portal-to41
portal actions” following Congress’ enactment of the Fair Labor
42
Standards Act of 1938. The codification of a separate time period
may also have been a response to the pending changes in a large
number of government employment contracts near the end of
43
World War II.
The newly introduced statutory provision governing the
recovery of wages greatly reduced the time period for bringing
44
employment contract disputes.
The statute defines “wages”
broadly to include “all remuneration for services or employment,
including commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all
remuneration in any medium other than cash, where the
45
relationship of master and servant exists.”
Prior to the 1945
amendment, these sorts of employee contract claims were governed
46
by the six-year period for general contract disputes. Minnesota
courts extended the statute’s reach even further by expressly
40. Act of Apr. 23, 1945, ch. 513, § 1, 1945 Minn. Laws 1006, 1006–07
(codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (1945)).
41. “Portal-to-portal action” refers to employee claims for wages associated
with certain preliminary work activities consistent with the payment requirements
set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA). The term stems from
the groundbreaking 1946 Supreme Court decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens
Pottery Co., dubbed the “portal-to-portal case,” in which the Court held that
preliminary work activities are properly included as working time under the FLSA.
328 U.S. 680, 692−93 (1946). In response to the Supreme Court decision,
Congress subsequently amended the FLSA with the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,
which defined preliminary and postliminary work activities as those exclusively
arising out of contract, custom, or practice. 29 U.S.C.A. § 252 (1947).
42. Homewood Theatre v. Loew’s Inc., 101 F. Supp. 76, 77 (D. Minn. 1951).
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 introduced a forty-five hour work week
maximum, created a national minimum wage, and guaranteed “time-and-a-half”
overtime pay for certain occupations. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 206–207.
43. Kohout v. Shakopee Foundry Co., 281 Minn. 401, 404, 162 N.W.2d 237,
239 (1968) (“We can only speculate that the statute may have been prompted by
the pending renegotiation of great numbers of government contracts.”).
44. Compare MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (1941) (prescribing a general limitations
period of six years for general actions under contract), with MINN. STAT. §
541.07(5) (1945) (prescribing a two-year limitations period for the recovery of
wages specifically).
45. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010).
46. See MINN. STAT. § 541.05 (1941) (containing no provision governing the
recovery of wages specifically).
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holding that actions for breaches of most employment contracts
were essentially actions for the recovery of wages and were subject
47
to the two-year limitations period, thus eliminating any distinction
between the recovery of wages already earned and future wages due
under contract.
In 1984, an exception was included in the limitations statute
for wage recovery that increased the limitations period from two
years to three where the employer’s withholding of wages was
48
found to be “willful.” This exception was presumably enacted as a
means of further punishing deliberate employer misconduct, but
establishing whether or not the conduct was willful required that
the issue be submitted to a fact finder, presumably after some
49
period of litigation.
Whereas most limitations statutes are
intended to dispose of claims summarily before trial, the inclusion
of the willful conduct exception means that some wage recovery
claims accruing more than two years prior to the commencement
of an action may be fully litigated before determining whether the
50
plaintiff had a right to bring suit in the first place.
Beyond the 1984 exception, the separate limitations statute for
wage recovery claims has remained substantively unchanged since

47. See, e.g., Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 112 F.3d 368, 371 (8th
Cir. 1997) (“Minnesota courts consistently hold that all damages arising out of the
employment relationship are subject to § 541.07(5).” (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Homewood Theatre, 101 F. Supp. at 77 (stating that the
legislative history behind the enactment of section 541.07(5) shows that the statute
was intended to limit all actions for wages, damages, and penalties arising out of
the employer-employee relationship); Worwa v. Solz Enters., Inc., 307 Minn. 490,
492–93, 238 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1976) (holding that an action for breach of an oral
contract of employment was essentially an action for wages and was subject to the
two-year limitations period set by Minnesota statutes section 541.07(5)); Roaderick
v. Lull Eng’g Co., 296 Minn. 385, 387–88, 208 N.W.2d 761, 763 (1973) (holding
that the portion of the claim which had accrued more than two years before the
commencement of an action based on quantum meruit for the recovery of the
reasonable value of services performed under an unenforceable oral contract was
barred by the limitations period in Minnesota statute section 541.07(5)).
48. Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 608, § 4, 1984 Minn. Laws 1450, 1454 (providing a
three-year limitations period for actions where nonpayment of wages was “willful”).
49. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Minn. 1989) (“Whether
there has been ‘willful’ nonpayment of wages within the meaning of section
541.07(5) is not in this case amenable to summary disposition.”).
50. See id. (“Unlike other statutes of repose, which are designed to dispose of
stale claims summarily, the two tiered limitation provided in section 541.07(5)
seems almost certainly to demand submission of the question of willfulness to the
fact finder so that it can be decided which limitation, two years or three, is
applicable.”).
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51

its enactment. Consistency in statutory language, however, did
52
Once a court
not prevent issues in the statute’s application.
ascertained the applicable limitations period, it would then have to
53
determine exactly when the limitations period started.
Minnesota’s statute provides that the limitations period begins
54
when “the cause of action accrues.”
In the context of wage
55
however,
recovery and employment contract disputes,
determining when a cause of action accrues has been somewhat
complicated by the ongoing payments typically associated with
employment contracts. This is because many disputes arise and
continue for an indefinite period during an existing employment
relationship. Most employees experience breaches in the effect the
56
disputes have on their wage payments.
The complexity has boiled down to whether pay periods
57
following an initial breach reset the two-year statute of limitations.
More specifically, the issue is whether a single breach occurs at the
51. Compare Act of Apr. 23, 1945, ch. 513, § 1, 1945 Minn. Laws 1006, 1006–
07, with MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010).
52. Though the legislature has expressly codified that the limitations period
begins to run when the cause of action accrues, no statute specifically defines
exactly when that accrual occurs. MacRae v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d
711, 716 (Minn. 2008). This has left courts with the burden of ascertaining exactly
when a particular cause of action accrues. See, e.g., Dalton v. Dow Chem. Co., 280
Minn. 147, 152–53, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 (1968) (holding that a cause of action
accrues when all of the elements of the action have occurred and the claim would
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure 12.02(e)). Courts thus have been given some discretion in the
application of the statute of limitations based on when they determine a claim
could survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Herbert v. City of
Fifty Lakes, 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008) (“When reviewing a case
dismissed . . . for failure to state a claim . . . the question before [the reviewing]
court is whether the complaint sets forth a legally sufficient claim for relief.”).
53. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 832 (Minn. 2011).
54. MINN. STAT. § 541.01 (2010); see also Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co.,
201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W. 694, 697 (1937) (“It is also a well-established rule
that the statute ‘commences to run against a cause of action from the time it
accrues—in other words from the time an action thereon can be commenced.’”).
55. In the context of wage recovery, the two-year limitations period is applied
whenever “the gravamen of the action is the breach of an employment contract.”
Portlance v. Golden Valley State Bank, 405 N.W.2d 240, 243 (Minn. 1987).
56. See Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1205 (discussing four possible
results stemming from the application of the statute of limitations to continuing or
repeated wrongs).
57. See Pitts v. City of Kankakee, 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Drawing
the line between something that amounts to a ‘fresh act’ each day and something
that is merely a lingering effect of an earlier, distinct, violation is not always
easy.”).
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initial wrongful act (starting a single limitations period) or whether
affected pay periods following the initial act constitute multiple
58
breaches (starting separate limitations periods with each breach).
These competing approaches to ascertaining when a breach has
occurred were nicely summarized by the New Mexico Court of
59
Appeals in Tull v. City of Albuquerque.
In Tull, city employees brought an action against the City for
breach of employment contract after the City violated a merit
system ordinance when it expanded city employees’ job duties
60
without increasing their pay. The City argued that the employees’
action, brought in 1994, was time-barred under New Mexico’s
three-year statute of limitations, because the alleged breach
occurred only once in 1987, upon the City’s initial failure to give
61
the requisite pay raise. The city employees argued that a new
breach of contract occurred with each defective paycheck that did
not include the raise to which they were entitled, and as such, they
could recover damages for all paychecks that did not include the
raise during the three years preceding the filing of their complaint,
as well as all defective paychecks issued since the complaint was
62
filed.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals coined the term
“continuing-wrong theory” to describe the city employees’
argument, and the term “single-wrong with continuing effects”
63
theory to refer to the City’s argument.
With no clarification by the state legislature as to which
competing theory applies, Minnesota courts have been left with
58. See Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1205. Compare Botten v.
Shorma, 440 F.3d 979, 980–81 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that a separate cause of
action for bonuses accrued with each date a bonus was due under agreement),
Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989) (holding that each failure to
pay yearly commissions constituted a new cause of action from which the
limitations period would run), and Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394, 397 (1868)
(holding that a separate limitations period began to run from each missed
installment of wages when they became due), with Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson
& Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 842–43 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a new cause of
action did not accrue for failure to promote following the employer’s earlier
wrongful refusal to hire), Press v. Howard Univ., 540 A.2d 733, 734–35 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that continuing damages in the form of lost income flowed from a
single breach), and Tull v. City of Albuquerque, 907 P.2d 1010, 1011–12 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1995) (finding that lower paychecks were merely damages resulting from a
single, actionable wrong).
59. 907 P.2d at 1010.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1011.
62. Id. at 1010–11.
63. Id. at 1011.
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considerable discretion when applying the statute.
Early
65
Minnesota cases seemed to follow the continuing-wrong theory in
66
wage recovery claims, but some lower courts have distinguished
the accrual of claims for the nonpayment of wages from the accrual
67
of other types of contract claims. The judicial tendency to count
affected pay periods as separate breaches appeared to continue
through to at least 1989, when the Minnesota Supreme Court
seemingly reaffirmed application of the continuing-wrong theory in
68
Levin, which serves as the primary point of authority in support of
69
the continuing-wrong argument raised in Park Nicollet.
III. THE PARK NICOLLET DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural Posture

Plaintiff, Arlyn Hamann, M.D., began employment with
70
Defendant, Park Nicollet Clinic, in 1974, as a physician in the
71
Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of Park Nicollet’s Saint
72
Louis Park clinic. Hamann’s duties included occasionally seeing
64. MacRae v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn. 2008)
(“Although the limitations period begins to run when the cause of action accrues,
the statute does not define when such accrual occurs.”).
65. See Tull, 907 P.2d at 1011 (coining the terms “continuing-wrong” and
“single-wrong with continuing effects” to describe the competing arguments for
when a breach of employment contract occurs).
66. See, e.g., Wood v. Cullen, 13 Minn. 394, 397 (1868).
67. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Datatrak Int’l, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 893 (D. Minn.
1999) (holding that when the underlying claim is based on an ongoing
nonpayment of wages, the cause of action accrues separately each time a payment
is due but not paid); Guercio v. Prod. Automation Corp., 664 N.W.2d 379, 387
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (“A breach-of-contract cause of action accrues generally at
the time of the breach, even if the damages do not manifest themselves until
later . . . . But under Minnesota law, a contractual cause of action for lost wages
arises each time a payment is due, but is not paid.” (citations omitted)).
68. Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989) (holding that each
failure to pay commissions constitutes a separate breach).
69. See infra Part III.B.
70. Park Nicollet Health Services is a nonprofit, integrated healthcare system
located in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, with more than 8200 employees, including
more than 1000 Park Nicollet physicians on staff. About: Overview, PARK NICOLLET
HEALTH SERVICES, http://www.parknicollet.com/About (last visited Oct. 8, 2012).
71. Obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) are two medical specialties that
deal with the female reproductive organs in the pregnant and non-pregnant state,
respectively. See Definition of Obstetrician/gynecologist, MEDICINENET.COM, http://
www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=7877 (last visited Oct. 8,
2012).
72. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 2011).
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obstetrics patients during nights and weekends.
These “night
74
75
call[s]” involved working before or after normal business hours.
76
In 1995, Park Nicollet adopted a Length of Service
Recognition Policy (the “Policy”) that applied to all physicians in
77
the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, including Hamann.
The Policy was intended to encourage physicians to remain with
Park Nicollet by rewarding their length of service with the
78
company.
The Policy rewarded physicians by exempting them
from the night call obligation once they met the Policy’s
79
requirements. To be exempt from taking night calls under the
Policy, physicians were required to: “(1) be at least 60 years of age;
(2) have at least 15 years of taking OB call; (3) be at least a twothirds full-time employee; and (4) have the approval of physicians
80
in the call rotation.” Following adoption of the Policy, at least one
physician was able to exercise his rights under the Policy and
81
discontinue night calls without a reduction in salary.
Hamann became eligible to receive benefits under the Policy
in 2004, but when he informed the department chair of his intent
to exercise the Policy, he was convinced to defer exercising his
rights until April 2005 because of staffing concerns in the
82
department. When Hamann renewed his request to stop taking
night calls in April 2005, the department chair stated that “the
73. Id.
74. Id. at 830 n.1 (“[N]ight call” is the term used by the parties for seeing
patients outside of normal business hours.).
75. Id. at 830.
76. By 1995, Hamann had been employed by Park Nicollet for twenty-one
years. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The Policy was adopted in an effort to encourage department
physicians to remain with Park Nicollet for a long period of time so as to promote
continuity and help maintain adequate staffing. Brief for Respondent at 4, Park
Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d 828 (No. A10-658), 2011 WL 7415272, at *4. The Policy also
helped to reduce the costs of physician turnover while ensuring patient needs
were met by experienced physicians. Id.
79. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at *4.
80. Id.
81. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 830. Dr. Edward Maeder, another physician
in Hamann’s department, was allowed to exercise his rights under the Policy when
he became eligible upon his sixtieth birthday. Brief for Respondent, supra note
78, at *6.
82. Brief for Respondent, supra note 78, at *6. Hamann became eligible
under the Policy upon his sixtieth birthday in 2004, but, in an effort to avoid
potential staffing issues, the department chair convinced Hamann to defer
exercising his rights until April 2005 because a number of department physicians
were on maternity leave. Id.
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Policy no longer existed and would no longer be honored,” and if
83
he stopped taking night calls his salary would be cut. Hamann
initially elected to continue taking night calls rather than have his
84
salary reduced.
Three years later, however, in February 2008,
Hamann was ultimately forced to stop taking night calls because of
85
health reasons.
In response to Hamann’s withdrawal, and
consistent with the terms of the original employment agreement,
86
Park Nicollet reduced his salary.
Following the salary reduction, Hamann brought suit against
Park Nicollet in October 2009, more than three years after Park
87
Nicollet’s initial refusal to honor the Policy.
The complaint
alleged claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and
88
unjust enrichment.
In lieu of answering, Park Nicollet filed a
89
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on grounds that
90
Minnesota’s two-year statute of limitations for wage recovery had
91
run and the claims were time-barred. The trial court granted Park
Nicollet’s motion, holding that Hamann’s claim was barred under
92
either the two- or three-year statute of limitations because Park
Nicollet’s breach occurred more than three years prior, in 2005,
when Hamann first learned that he would not be permitted to
93
exercise the Policy.

83. Id. at *6–7.
84. Id. at *7. Hamann alleged that he was compelled by the department chair
to continue taking night calls and doing so in his early sixties “adversely affected
his health.” Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, No. 27-CV-09-28698, 2010 WL 2650383,
at *2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 792 N.W.2d 468
(Minn. Ct. App.), rev’d, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011), 2010 WL 2782072.
88. Id. Hamann also alleged misrepresentation and failure to pay wages, but
later voluntarily dismissed those claims. Id.
89. MINN. R. CIV. P. 12.02(e); Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, 792 N.W.2d
468, 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011).
90. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010).
91. Hamann, 792 N.W.2d at 470.
92. Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 2011).
Because Hamann’s claims were possibly barred by both the two-year limitations
period as well as the three-year exception provided for “willful” nonpayment, the
issue of whether Park Nicollet’s alleged behavior was willful was not discussed. Id.
at 832 n.3; see also MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (providing a three-year limitations
period for “willful” nonpayment of wages). For further analysis of the three-year
exception for willful nonpayment specifically see Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1989).
93. Hamann, 2010 WL 2650383, at *8.
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The Court of Appeals Decision

Hamann appealed the trial court’s dismissal, arguing that the
limitations period had not run because his claim was based on a
series of ongoing breaches that occurred with every reduced
94
paycheck he received.
Hamann further argued that Park
Nicollet’s initial refusal to honor the Policy was not an outright
breach of any present contractual duty, but rather a repudiation of
a future obligation, which does not start the statute of limitations
95
Hamann relied
until the time for performance comes due.
extensively on the Minnesota Supreme Court’s prior decision in
96
Levin, which seemingly endorsed Minnesota’s application of the
97
continuing-wrong theory in wage recovery cases.
In Levin, the plaintiff had a contract with his employer that
stipulated he would be paid a commission, in addition to salary,
98
based on a portion of the company’s annual sales. In 1982, Levin
received his first commission check, but received no commission
99
checks for subsequent years.
When Levin inquired about his
unpaid commissions in 1984, his employer made statements that
100
implied none would be paid. In October 1986, Levin brought an
101
action to recover the outstanding commissions.
Levin’s employer moved for summary judgment, arguing that
102
103
the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The
district court granted the motion, and the court of appeals
104
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the breach
affirmed.
stemming from a failure to pay commissions could only occur at
the close of a given sales year when the amount of the commission

94. Hamann, 792 N.W.2d at 470–71.
95. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 837; see also Matteson v. Blaisdell, 148 Minn.
352, 355, 182 N.W. 442, 443 (1921) (“A verbal denial of the existence of a contract
or a declaration of an intention not to comply with its terms by one of the parties,
prior to the time he is required to perform the same and after the other party has
fully performed, does not set the statute of limitations running as against the other
party.”).
96. Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989).
97. See Hamann, 792 N.W.2d at 471.
98. Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 802.
99. Id. at 803.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. MINN. STAT. § 541.07(5) (2010).
103. Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 803.
104. Id.
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105

check could be calculated.
The court held that the outstanding
commission checks constituted a series of breaches rather than the
106
single breach that Levin’s employer had alleged.
Because each
failure to pay a given year’s commission created a new cause of
action that started a separate limitations period, the court held that
107
Levin’s claim was not time-barred under the statute of limitations.
The court of appeals agreed with Hamann and found Levin to
108
Park Nicollet argued that the case was
be controlling.
distinguishable because Levin involved an installment contract that
109
came due only at a predetermined date in the future.
The
appellate court rejected this distinction, concluding that “Park
Nicollet had a future obligation to pay or provide specific benefits
to Dr. Hamann at certain stated intervals for an indefinite period
110
into the future,” and “fixed due dates were not a critical factor in
111
the Levin court’s analysis.”
The appellate court reversed the
district court’s dismissal, holding that Hamann’s claim was not
time-barred because a new cause of action for the recovery of wages
accrued each time a payment was due, but not paid, by Park
112
Nicollet.
C.

The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
113

Park Nicollet appealed the reversal.
On appeal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
each paycheck issued after an alleged breach of contract resets the
114
two-year limitations period for wage recovery claims.
The
115
question required the court to expand on its analysis in Levin and
to specifically weigh in on the competing single-wrong and
continuing-wrong theories used by lower courts in applying the
116
statute of limitations to employment contract disputes.

105.
106.
107.
108.
2010).
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, 792 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Minn. Ct. App.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn. 2011).
Id. at 832.
Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. 1989).
See supra Part II.D.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’
holding that each paycheck created a separate cause of action
117
under the continuing-wrong theory.
The court acknowledged
and endorsed its application of the continuing-wrong theory in
118
Levin, but found the facts of the case to be distinguishable,
emphasizing that, unlike Hamann’s salary, the commission
payment obligation in Levin, if any, was distinct from that in any
other year because it could only be determined at the close of a
119
given sales year.
The court focused on the distinction between
present and future contractual obligations—a distinction that the
120
court of appeals did not believe to be critical —and held that the
continuing-wrong theory applies only where an employer has an
121
ongoing future obligation to an employee.
The court concluded that the wrongful conduct alleged by
Hamann was Park Nicollet’s decision to require physicians over age
122
sixty to take night call. Beyond the promise contained within the
Policy itself, Hamann alleged no other contractual provision or
123
obligation binding Park Nicollet to the night call exemption.
Accordingly, the court found that Park Nicollet’s stated refusal to
honor the Policy in 2005 constituted a breach of a present
obligation because Park Nicollet’s performance became due
124
immediately upon Hamann’s request to exercise.
The
subsequent reductions in Hamann’s salary represented damages
stemming from a single actionable breach and not separate
125
breaches in themselves.
In responding to Hamann’s repudiation argument, the court
126
was similarly unconvinced.
Hamann argued that Park Nicollet’s
127
refusal in 2005 constituted a repudiation of a future obligation to
117. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 837.
118. Id. at 835.
119. Id.
120. Hamann v. Park Nicollet Clinic, 792 N.W.2d 468, 472 (Minn. Ct. App.
2010) (“[F]ixed due dates were not a critical factor in the Levin court’s analysis.”).
121. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 835 (“In contrast to Levin, the obligation at
issue in this case was not something that Park Nicollet was contractually or
otherwise required to perform on an ongoing basis.”).
122. Id. (“The wrongful conduct at issue here, according to the complaint, is
Park Nicollet’s decision to require that physicians over age 60 take night calls.”).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 836.
126. Id. at 837.
127. Id. (“An anticipatory repudiation . . . occurs when a promisor renounces a
contractual duty [at some point] before the time for performance has arrived.”);
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128

pay wages.
His theory was that Park Nicollet’s performance was
not due until he ceased taking night call, at which point Park
129
Nicollet would have an obligation not to reduce his salary.
Hamann’s repudiation argument was also based on the Levin
decision, in which the court found that the employer’s statement
that he would not pay further commissions constituted an
anticipatory repudiation of that employer’s future obligation to pay
130
commissions.
The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Hamann’s
repudiation argument, distinguishing Levin the same way it did in
131
disposing of Hamann’s continuing-wrong argument.
The
commission payment in Levin was a future obligation because it
132
could only be calculated at the close of the sales year. The court
held that Park Nicollet’s obligation under the Policy was not a
future obligation because it became due at the time Hamann
133
notified Park Nicollet of his intent to exercise the Policy.
The
court found that Park Nicollet’s obligation under the Policy was
similar to a contract for payment on demand, and as such,
performance was due when Hamann first demanded it in 2005, not
134
when he stopped taking night calls in 2008.
Accordingly, the
court concluded that Hamann’s cause of action accrued once in

see also Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 804–05 (Minn. 1989) (“[T]he
renunciation and repudiation of a contract by one of the parties does not set the
statute of limitation in motion against the other party although it gives the latter
an election to sue immediately.” (citing Wold v. Wold, 138 Minn. 409, 415, 165
N.W. 229, 231 (1917))); Statutes of Limitation, supra note 14, at 1207–08 (“[W]here
the offending conduct precedes the date prescribed for the first performance to
be rendered by the offending party . . . it may be desirable to have specially
adapted rules.”).
128. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 837.
129. Id. at 838.
130. Id. (citing Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 804).
131. Id. at 837–38.
132. Id. at 837 (citing Levin, 441 N.W.2d at 804).
133. Id. at 838 (“But the breach at issue in this case . . . was not an obligation
that would arise at some point in the future; it was an obligation owed to Hamann
in April 2005, when Hamann demanded performance.”).
134. Id. at 838; see Bannitz v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. of Stevens Point, Wis.,
219 Minn. 235, 237, 17 N.W.2d 372, 373 (1945) (“Where it appears from a
contract that it is the intention of the parties that the money or claim which is the
subject matter thereof is to be paid upon a demand in fact, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until an actual demand for payment is made.”).
See generally J. A. Bock, Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against
Note Payable On Demand, 71 A.L.R.2D 284 (1960) (discussing contracts for payment
on demand).
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135

2005, and his claim, which he filed in 2009, was barred by the
136
statute of limitations.
In assessing the application of the single- and continuingwrong theories, the court instructed lower courts to examine the
nature of the alleged wrongful conduct in determining when a
137
cause of action accrues. If the wrongful conduct is itself a failure
to pay wages, then a cause of action may accrue, under the
continuing-wrong theory, with each failure to pay wages when they
138
become due.
However, where wages are affected merely as a
consequence of some other wrongful act, the single-wrong theory
applies, and an actionable breach accrues only once, no matter
139
how many pay periods are subsequently affected.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Park Nicollet decision narrows the application of the
continuing-wrong theory which the court previously endorsed in
Levin. In holding that the continuing-wrong theory applies where
an employer’s wrongful conduct is the express withholding of
wages, but not where wages are effected merely as a consequence of
140
some other breach, the Minnesota Supreme Court seems to
effectively separate the breach of an employment contract from the
impact it may have on employee’s future wage payments. This rigid
separation between cause and effect in breaches of employment
contracts might unfairly limit employees’ ability to recover benefits
owed to them under certain types of policies that are revoked
before employees become eligible or elect to receive benefits.
The potential issues facing employees that arise in the wake of
the Park Nicollet decision can be illustrated by examining two
elements that might disproportionately affect the beginning of the
statute of limitations in breaches of employment contracts:
eligibility requirements and the intent to exercise. The eligibility
element deals with how conditions precedent to receiving policy
benefits affect the accrual of actions for breach of contract. The
intent element deals with how the subjective intent of an employee
135. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 836–37 (citing Tull v. City of Albuquerque, 907 P.2d 1010, 1011–13
(N.M. Ct. App. 1995); Press v. Howard Univ., 540 A.2d 733, 734–35 (D.C. 1988)).
138. Id. at 837.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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in his or her decision not to exercise elective policy benefits affects
the accrual of a breach of contract action. Both elements give rise
to scenarios that demonstrate the potential problems employees
may experience in pursuing future wage recovery claims.
A.

Eligibility Requirements May Lead to Inconsistent and Inequitable
Application of the Statute of Limitations

In the context of Park Nicollet, the eligibility element is raised
by the issue of whether Hamann’s breach of contract action would
have accrued if he had not met the Policy’s eligibility requirements
at the time Park Nicollet informed him that the Policy would no
141
longer be honored.
This issue was recognized by the Minnesota
142
Supreme Court but not addressed in the Park Nicollet opinion. In
attempting to reconcile the issue with the court’s decision, there
seem to be two possible alternatives: either Hamann’s cause of
action accrued when he became eligible under the Policy’s
requirements, or his cause of action accrued upon his notice of the
Policy’s termination, regardless of whether he was eligible to
receive the benefits.
The first argument may be the most convincing, but seems
likely to lead to claims with inconsistent and arbitrary results based
143
on differences in eligibility between employees.
Because Park
Nicollet’s performance under the Policy would not come due until
144
Hamann satisfied the Policy’s eligibility requirements,
the
eligibility requirements can be construed as conditions precedent
145
to Park Nicollet’s performance. Termination or revocation of the
141. Such as if Park Nicollet provided a general notice to all employees
informing them of the Policy’s revocation.
142. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 n.7.
143. To be eligible to “receive benefits under the Policy, a physician had to:
(1) be at least 60 years old; (2) have ‘[a]t least fifteen years of taking OB [night]
call;’ (3) be working at least two-thirds of a full-time position; and (4) have the
approval of physicians in the ‘call rotation.’” Id. at 830 (alterations in original).
144. See Bachertz v. Hayes-Lucas Lumber Co., 201 Minn. 171, 176, 275 N.W.
694, 697 (1937) (“Of course, ‘when a right depends upon some condition or
contingency, the cause of action accrues and the statute runs upon the fulfillment
of the condition or the happening of the contingency.’” (quoting 4 DUNNELL
MINN. DIGEST, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 5602 (2d ed. 1927))); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 225(1) (1981) (“Performance of a duty subject to a
condition cannot become due unless the condition occurs or its non-occurrence is
excused.”).
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 (“A condition is an event,
not certain to occur, which must occur, unless its non-occurrence is excused,
before performance under a contract becomes due.”).
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Policy before the conditions were satisfied would constitute a
146
repudiation of Park Nicollet’s obligation and would not start the
147
limitations period running against ineligible employees.
On the other hand, eligible employees, like Hamann, would
experience an outright breach if the Policy were revoked or
terminated, thus starting the limitations period on their claim
148
immediately. Because eligible employees would be forced to sue
within the limitations period, while ineligible employees could
postpone the start of the limitations period indefinitely by refusing
to satisfy any of the Policy’s conditions, different employees could
have vastly different periods of time in which to litigate claims
arising from the same wrongful conduct.
Allowing some employees more time than others in which to
bring a claim based on the same wrongful conduct would
undermine the policy rationale behind having a limitations period
in the first place. Statutes of limitations are intended to reduce the
inequities associated with forcing parties to defend claims after an
unreasonable amount of time has passed in which evidence may
149
have been lost or forgotten.
Letting some employees bring a
claim when it has been barred for others does not address those
inequities. An unreasonable amount of time for some employees
could be much shorter than it would be others. The fairness to an
employer would be based not on the availability of evidence or on
the amount of time that has passed since the wrongful conduct
occurred, but on whether an employee satisfied arbitrary
conditions that do not directly impact the conduct of the employer
or the remedies sought by the employee. Such inconsistency

146. Id. § 250 (defining a repudiation as “a statement by the obligor to the
obligee indicating that the obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give
the obligee a claim for damages for total breach”).
147. See Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1989) (holding
that where a party to a contract declares “an intention not to comply with its terms
prior to the time the declarant must perform,” the statute of limitations does not
begin to run); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 951 (1952) (“[T]he
statutory period is held not to begin to run until the day set for the actual
performance promised or until the injured party has definitely expressed his
intention to regard the repudiation as a breach.”).
148. See Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 (“Hamann, having satisfied the
eligibility criteria, triggered that obligation when he informed the Department
Chair in April 2005 that he wished to ‘exercise the Policy.’ And Park Nicollet
breached the obligation when the Department Chair declined to allow Hamann to
do so.”).
149. Id. at 832.
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emphasizes the arbitrary nature of limitations periods and does not
promote the policy that justifies their use.
The second argument seems like it could lead to even less
desirable outcomes.
If Hamann’s cause of action accrued
regardless of whether the eligibility requirements were satisfied,
then he could be forced into a scenario that required him to
choose between suing immediately for damages that may be
150
uncertain, nonexistent, or too speculative to be recoverable, or to
postpone bringing suit and risk being time-barred under the
151
statute of limitations for waiting until harm actually manifests. In
this scenario, ineligible employees, especially those that are many
years away from becoming eligible, are the most vulnerable because
calculating the exact impact of policy revocation or alteration could
152
be extremely difficult.
Where an employer’s termination of a policy is found to be
repudiation to employees who have not satisfied the eligibility
requirements, additional factors may further complicate the
decision of when to bring suit for promised benefits. Typically, a
defendant’s unequivocal repudiation excuses the plaintiff from
performing any conditions precedent to the defendant’s promised
153
performance. An employer’s repudiation of its policy obligations
150. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 392 (Minn. 1992) (“A
party is entitled to recover for a breach of contract only those damages which: (a)
arise directly and naturally in the usual course of things from the breach itself; or
(b) are the consequences of special circumstances known to or reasonably
supposed to have been contemplated by the parties when the contract was
made.”); Sloggy v. Crescent Creamery Co., 72 Minn. 316, 318, 75 N.W. 225, 226
(1898) (affirming dismissal of a breach of contract claim because nominal
damages alone were insufficient to sustain a cause of action). For a discussion on
certainty as a limitation on damages, see generally JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI
AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.8 (6th ed. 2009).
151. See Herrmann v. McMenomy & Severson, 590 N.W.2d 641, 643 (Minn.
1999) (acknowledging that “the running of the statute [of limitations] does not
depend on the ability to ascertain the exact amount of damages.”).
152. See Griffin v. Colver, 16 N.Y. 489, 491 (N.Y. 1858) (“It is a well established
rule of the common law that the damages to be recovered for a breach of contract
must be shown with certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture . . . .”).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 255 (1981) (“Where a party’s
repudiation contributes materially to the non-occurrence of a condition of one of
his duties, the non-occurrence is excused.”); CORBIN, supra note 147, § 970 (“If the
time for defendant’s promised performance was not definitely fixed in the
contract but the defendant promised to perform . . . as soon as the plaintiff should
have performed certain conditions precedent, a repudiation by the defendant is
regarded by all courts without exception, as a breach of the contract, creating an
immediate right of action . . . . All agree . . . that the defendant’s repudiation
excuses the plaintiff from performing conditions precedent . . . .”); 13 SAMUEL
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could thus be found to discharge any conditions precedent to
employees receiving benefits under the repudiated policy,
154
including eligibility requirements.
Previously ineligible
employees may then be able to bring an action immediately to
recover promised benefits as if they were currently eligible,
presumably increasing the certainty with which they would be able
155
to prove damages.
The choice evoked by the second argument alludes to a
broader problem. Does the single-wrong theory allow employers to
effectively revoke policies with impunity before employees become
eligible for the future benefits? Park Nicollet seems to have left
employers with the opportunity to unilaterally alter or terminate
employment policies before employees become eligible to exercise
156
them, thus rendering any promised benefits illusory.
In the
context of other types of benefit policies, the consequences of
allowing employers to alter the terms of an existing employment
contract without employee assent become more apparent.
157
As an example, in an at-will employment jurisdiction,
employers could attract employees with contract provisions
guaranteeing job security. Employers could then unilaterally
eliminate the provision, allowing them to terminate the employees
at any time, thus undermining the very benefits that the employees
were promised initially. Employees would be similarly forced to
choose between suing immediately upon notice that the provision
158
has been eliminated, or waiting until they are fired in a way that

WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 39:38, at
670 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that the law “recognizes the obvious injustice of
requiring the nonrepudiating party to perform [a condition] when the promisor
has indicated that he or she will not keep his or her promise”).
154. See CORBIN, supra note 147, § 970.
155. See generally PERILLO, supra note 150, §§ 14.18–.19.
156. A promise is illusory where it “appears on its face to be so insubstantial as
to impose no obligation at all on the promisor.” E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 2.13, at 75 (4th ed. 2004).
157. The typical employer-employee relationship is terminable at the will of
either party, meaning that an employer can dismiss an employee at any time, and
the employee is under no obligation to remain at the job. Brown v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
158. If an employee is not terminated outright, electing to sue immediately
upon notice that the job security provision has been eliminated would likely pose
difficulties in damage calculation. See Farnsworth, supra note 156, § 8.20
(“[A]ttempting to estimate damages in an action brought before the time for
performance would be a ‘matter of pure speculation and guesswork.’” (quoting
Charles Thaddeus Terry, Book Review, 34 HARV. L. REV. 891, 894 (1921))).
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159

is counter to the terms of the original employment agreement.
By leaving the question of whether eligibility affects the accrual of a
cause of action unanswered, the Minnesota Supreme Court may
force some future employees to make a choice between recovering
160
nominal damages immediately or not having a claim in the
future.
Both of the arguments pertaining to the eligibility element
demonstrate the substantial issues that could be raised in future
wage recovery claims in the wake of Park Nicollet. On the one hand,
some employees could arbitrarily postpone satisfying certain
conditions, like eligibility requirements, in order to indefinitely
161
maintain a cause of action.
On the other hand, employers may
be able to render promised policy benefits illusory by unilaterally
revoking them before employees become eligible to receive them.
Together, the issues highlight the important equitable
162
considerations that must be weighed in establishing any kind of
rigid standard for the application of the statute of limitations,
should the Minnesota Supreme Court be called on to resolve the
163
eligibility issue in the future.
B.

Withholding Demand for Benefits May Postpone the Start of the
Limitations Period

In addition to the substantial effect that eligibility
requirements seem to have on the accrual of wage recovery actions,
whether an employee intends to exercise those benefits after
becoming eligible to receive them may also have important
implications. If Hamann was eligible for benefits under the Policy
159. If an employee is terminated more than three years after first receiving
notice of the job security provision’s elimination, they may risk having their claim
barred by the statute of limitations.
160. Sloggy v. Crescent Creamery Co., 72 Minn. 316, 318, 75 N.W. 225, 226
(1898) (affirming dismissal of a breach of contract claim because nominal
damages alone were insufficient to sustain a cause of action).
161. See Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 837 (Minn. 2011)
(discussing eligibility requirements under the Policy).
162. See WOOD, supra note 13, § 5.
163. See Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1945) (weighing
the practical benefits of the statute of limitations against constitutional
considerations); see also Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463–64
(1975) (“[T]he period allowed for instituting suit inevitably reflects a value
judgment concerning the point at which the interests in favor of protecting valid
claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale
ones.”).
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in April 2005 but opted not to exercise his rights, perhaps because
he enjoyed taking night call or due to the needs of his patients,
would the breach action still have accrued in 2005? This element
was touched on in the court’s rejection of Hamann’s repudiation
argument, and its significance is illustrated in the way the court
characterized the Policy as being similar to a contract that calls for
164
payment on demand.
The court framed Park Nicollet’s obligation under the Policy
as being analogous to a contract for payment on demand, making
165
Park Nicollet’s performance due when Hamann demanded it.
“Where a condition precedent to a right of action exists, the cause
of action does not accrue and the statute of limitations does not
166
begin to operate until the condition is performed.”
Further,
“where the parties so frame their contract as to make prior
demand . . . a condition precedent to a right to sue, the statute of
167
limitations does not begin to run until demand is made.”
The
implication thus seems to be that if Hamann had not made the
demand to exercise his benefits, the cause of action would not have
accrued until he actually stopped taking night call.
Under the court’s reasoning, if Hamann had not made the
request to exercise Policy benefits, Park Nicollet’s performance
168
could not have come due.
Any affirmative notice that the Policy
169
had been revoked or terminated, occurring prior to a demand
for Policy benefits, would serve as a repudiation of a future
obligation, rather than as an immediate breach of a present
170
obligation. “Where a party to a contract does nothing more than
164. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 (“[T]he Policy is similar to a contract
calling for payment on demand.”).
165. Id.
166. Cummins & Walker Oil Co., Inc. v. Smith, 814 S.W.2d 884, 886 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991).
167. Id. at 887; accord Bannitz v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. of Stevens Point, Wis.,
219 Minn. 235, 237, 17 N.W.2d 372, 372 (1945) (“Where it appears from a
contract that it is the intention of the parties that the money or claim which is the
subject matter thereof is to be paid upon a demand in fact, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until an actual demand for payment is
made . . . .”).
168. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838 (“As soon as Hamann had satisfied the
conditions of the Policy and informed the Department Chair that he wished to
exercise the Policy and stop taking night call, Park Nicollet had a duty to
perform.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. Such as if Park Nicollet were to release a department-wide bulletin that
provided notice of the Policy’s termination.
170. Performance under a contract becomes due only when all necessary
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declare ‘an intention not to comply with its terms prior to the time
the declarant must perform,’ the statute of limitations does not
171
begin to run.”
An employee’s subjective intent to invoke policy
benefits by requesting them thus becomes the difference between
construing the termination of a policy as a repudiation rather than
an outright breach, which has a substantial impact on the
172
application of the statute of limitations.
Alternatively, by interpreting elective policy benefits as being
due upon demand, the court may actually be doing employees a
favor in future efforts to recover under altered or terminated
policies. Notwithstanding the effect that eligibility requirements
and other conditions may have on claim accrual, Minnesota is
among a minority of states that do not allow an employer to
unilaterally alter or terminate the various provisions of an
173
employment contract.
Under this minority rule, Park Nicollet
need only have provided an unqualified assertion that the Policy
had been revoked or terminated to be considered in breach and to
start the limitations period running against all affected

conditions have occurred. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 224 cmt. b
(1981). An anticipatory repudiation occurs when a promisor renounces a
contractual duty before the time for performance has passed. See Wold v. Wold,
138 Minn. 409, 415, 165 N.W. 229, 231 (1917); see also WILLISTON & LORD, supra
note 153, § 38.7, at 394, 405 (stating that a condition precedent “must be
performed or happen before a duty of immediate performance arises on the
promise which the condition qualifies” and that “a promisor’s duty does not
become absolute unless and until a condition precedent occurs”).
171. Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d 828, 837 (quoting Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 441
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 1989)).
172. Where a party repudiates a future obligation, the statute of limitations
does not run until the time for performance has arrived, even though the injured
party has the right to sue immediately. Id. at 838. Where a party fails to perform
an obligation at the time performance is due, that party has breached by
nonperformance and the statute of limitations begins to run immediately upon
the breach, regardless of whether damages have occurred. See 8 DUNNELL MINN.
DIGEST CONTRACTS § 12 (5th ed. 2009) (“A breach of contract occurs when one
party renounces liability under the contract, [or] totally or partially fails to
perform . . . .”).
173. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 629–30 (Minn. 1983)
(holding that the indefinite duration of an employment contract does not by itself
preclude the enforceability of unilaterally created provisions of employee
handbooks, including job security provisions). In a majority of jurisdictions,
contract provisions unilaterally enacted by the employer are unenforceable in an
action for breach of contract and, as a result, employers may unilaterally alter or
terminate such provisions after a reasonable time if employees are given
reasonable notice and the modification does not affect any vested employee
benefits. Asmus v. Pac. Bell, 999 P.2d 71, 76−77 (Cal. 2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 15

2012]

WILL WORK FOR PROMISES

397

174

employees. In finding that the Policy required Hamann’s request
to exercise before Park Nicollet’s performance became due, the
court may have provided employees with an argument that the
unilateral modification or termination of an elective policy is an
anticipatory repudiation rather than an outright breach, thus
postponing the start of the limitations period.
Given that the Minnesota Supreme Court did not specifically
address the effect that eligible employees withholding demand for
benefits may have on the accrual of a cause of action, it is unclear
exactly how significant the intent element is in the Park Nicollet
holding. The court characterized the Policy as being similar to a
contract for payment on demand, but it did not go so far as to
175
extend that characterization to other elective benefit policies.
Further, the court did not engage in any broader discussion about
employers’ ability to unilaterally alter employment contracts. This
makes it at least possible for employers to simply revoke demand
provisions prior to eliminating a policy entirely so as to
unequivocally start the limitations period for all employees upon
notice, regardless of whether demand is made.
By not addressing whether Park Nicollet would have
committed a breach in 2005 if Hamann had not requested
performance, the court may leave some employees with the ability
to postpone the start of the limitations period by withholding
demand for benefits when a policy is terminated. Employees could
thus have very different times in which to bring a claim based on an
employer’s single wrongful act. At the very least, employers may
have an incentive to ensure provisions of employment contracts are
drafted in a way that does not tie employer performance to
employee demand.
Without further clarification, however,
employers may find themselves defending wage recovery actions
based on policies revoked many years ago.
V. CONCLUSION
Park Nicollet highlights many complex issues that arise out of
the complicated interplay of legal and equitable principles in
employment contract disputes. Theories of contract law ensuring
employees have adequate time to bring valid claims against their
employers must be reconciled against equitable principles
174.
175.

Asmus, 999 P.2d at 76−77.
Park Nicollet, 808 N.W.2d at 838.
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arbitrarily limiting that time for the sake of fairness and judicial
economy. The legislative trend toward shorter limitations periods,
coupled with increasingly rigid judicial standards for determining
when the period starts to run, reflects a cost-benefit analysis that
seems to prioritize reducing the number of claims in Minnesota
courts. On an individual level, the shorter limitations periods and
stricter application standards may result in greater numbers of
legitimate claims being denied access to recovery. But on a larger
scale, employees will be discouraged from sleeping on their rights
in a way that prejudices employers and unduly burdens an
increasingly strained legal system.
More specifically, however, by limiting the application of the
continuing-wrong theory to only those employment contract claims
176
where the wrongful conduct is the refusal to pay wages itself, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has potentially restricted employees’
ability to recover future benefits promised under policies that are
revoked before they become eligible to receive them. Though the
decision is consistent with a broader trend aimed at keeping
177
limitations periods short and starting them early, it does not seem
to adequately address countervailing interests of ensuring that
178
plaintiffs have sufficient time to litigate legitimate disputes.
At
worst, Park Nicollet may force future employees to choose between
the practical viability of bringing a claim immediately and the
increased likelihood of having a claim barred outright by waiting
until harm actually manifests. At best, the issues not addressed in
the decision will likely need to be reassessed by the court in future
litigation.

176. Id. at 837.
177. See Littell, supra note 14, at 37–38 (discussing the shift from longer
general statutes of limitations to shorter periods in more categorically
differentiated statutes).
178. See Statutes of Limitations, supra note 14, at 1190–91 (indicating that
legislatures may generally limit or shorten the time within which actions may be
brought if there is a reasonable time left for the plaintiff to sue so as not to offend
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). See generally WOOD, supra
note 13, § 5.
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